WTC:mfd

MEMORANDUM

March 26, 1964

SUBJECT: Mexico - CIA Dissemination of Information on Lee Harvey Oswald on March 24, 1964

The CIA directed a memorandum to J. Lee Rankin (Commission Document No. 631) in which it set forth the dissemination of the information on Lee Harvey Oswald. I realize that this memorandum is only a partial answer to our inquiry to the CIA dated March 16, 1964 and I hope that the complete answers will give us/additional information we requested.

We would like to know just when the Mexican station got the information with respect to Lee Harvey Oswald and what was the information and how was it obtained. How did the information get from Mexico to the CIA in Washington, and in what form did it come?


At what point was the information that the Lee Harvey Oswald was probably the Lee Harvey Oswald who had defected and was married to a Russian developed so that when the telegram went from the CIA in Washington to the various agencies it contained such information. In other words, I would like to know whether this was information available in

















Mexico or did this additional information get in the message only after it reached Washington and the information was being disseminated to the various agencies.

As you know, we are still trying to get an explanation of the photograph which the FBI showed Marguerite Oswald soon after the assassination. I hope that paragraph 4 of the memorandum of March 24, 1964 sent Mr. Rankin by the CIA is not the answer which the CIA intends to give us as to this inquiry.

We should also determine why the Navy never furnished the CIA with copies of the most recent photographs of Oswald.

MEMORANDUM

FROM:

Coleman-Slawson

SUBJECT:

Statement of Pedro Gutierrez Valencia

In a letter to President Johnson dated December 2, 1963 and in three statements summarized by the FBI in Commission Nos 564, 566, and 663, Gutierrez has stated that on September 30, 1963 or on October 1, 1963, probably the latter, he saw a Cuban give money to an American, just outside the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, and he claims now to identify the American as Oswald. He fixes the time of the event as approximately 10:50 a.m.

The Mexican police check of Gutierrez shows him to be a responsible and respected person, and a car answering the description of the one he claims to have seen the American and Cuban enter? has been found to have been registered during the years 1963-64 under what is probably a fictitious name. His statements must therefore be given serious consideration.

The following inquiries might be worthwhile:

1. Guiterrez says that the woman whose credit he checked showed him a card which identified her as a "second counselor" of the Cuban Embassy. (Commission No. 564, page 4.) Perhaps CIA or FBI or some other source has a way of finding


out what person or persons carried the title of "second counselor" at this time. Gutierrez has also suggested that the name of the person may have been Maria Luisa Calderon. (Commission No. 566, page 10.) He should be asked how he got this name and, in addition, it should be a rather easy matter to check to see whether any person with this name was listed in the Mexico City telephone directory or in the official Mexican records of employees of the Cuban Embassy, etc.

- is that he noticed considerable detail because he was immediately alarmed by what he saw, since it appeared sinister and illegal, and because he is a staunch anti-communist and was therefore especially alert to something which appeared to be a communist plot. For these reasons, he says he tried his best to overhear the conversation and observe as much as he could and even to follow the Cuban and American car in his own car. The obvious question is why, if he felt so alarmed about the whole thing, he did not report it immediately to the responsible Mexican authorities. His answer to this question may shed considerable on whether he is making the whole affair.
- 3. The CIA has reported to the Commission that
 Oswald was observed in "mid-morning" at the office of the
 Soviet Military Attache in Mexico City. CIA has also reported

that Oswald was told by the Military Attache that he should inquiry at the Soviet Embassy, since the Military Attache knew nothing about his problem, and that Oswald did in fact then go to the Russian Embassy and spoke with the guard there. [The way in which the CIA has reported these events to us indicates that a hidden camera or other form of hidden observation may have been involved and, if this is the case, a rather precise record of the time at which Oswald appeared at one of the other of these places may exist.] Since Gutierrez now fixes the time of Oswald's appearance at the Cuban Embassy as 10:50 a.m. on October 1, the same day as the CIA's very reliable source states he was at the Soviet Military Attache and the Soviet Embassy, the possibility of conflict as to the times should be explored.

- 4. The automobile in which the payoff was supposedly to have occurred has been traced, possibly, to a certain "Arturo Gaona Elias," who may or may not be the same person as the man of the same name who is in the bug-spray business and who lives in Sonora, Mexico. It should not be too difficult to establish by checking of the man in Sonora's employers, etc. whether he could have been in Mexico City at the time in question. I assume, however, that this kind of follow-up is already under way.
- 5. If Oswald received any large amounts of money he sertainly did not have them in his possession when he was arrested in Dallas. It certainly would seem worthwhile that a routine check of the bank accounts and safety deposit boxes throughout the Mexico City area should be made for Oswald and

his known aliases. This kind of check probably ought to be made on general principles, quite apart from the Gutierrez assertions.



MEMORANDUM

April 2, 1964

FROM:

Coleman-Slawson

SUBJECT:

Mexico: Questions Raised by the Ambassador Mann

File

- l. What actual evidence is there that Oswald departed Mexico on October 3 by automobile? Can we see the documents involved? If not, we should ask to be introduced to the proper Mexican authorities for the purpose of making our investigation.
- 2. What is the "rather complete dossier" of Oswald's referred to in the telegram of November 28? We would of course like to see it.
- 3. What is the source of information referred to in the November 28 telegram, that Oswald intended to settle down in Odessa?
- 4. We would like more detail on Silvia Duran, for example, the evidence that she was a "promiscuous type."
- 5. [We would like to see copies of the transcripts of the "intercepts", translated if possible, in all cases where the intercepts refer to the assassination or related subjects. In particular, we would like to see the intercepts



















in which the allegation that money passed at the Cuban Embassy was discussed.

- 6. Why did Ambassador Mann feel so sure that Oswald got the name of the Hotel del Comercio from the Cuban Consulate?
- 7. What exactly is the evidence that the Hotel Cuba is a cover for Castro intelligence operations? Is this fact known so widely that virtually anyone who stays at this hotel is suspect, for example, those persons who were guests at the same time as Oswald, or is this fact known only in law-enforcement and diplomatic circles? Is it likely that the clerk at this hotel is a Cuban agent and is holding back information on Oswald, since he has stated that he has no recollection of Oswald ever having stayed at the hotel?
- 8. Has any further information come to light on the persons who were guests of the Hotel del Comercio on the same floor as Oswald? Would it be possible to have the Mexican police or other knowledgeable sources scan the entire hotel on the hope that they might spot other significant names?
- 9. We should see the entire Embassy file on the whole Kennedy assassination, including copies of all

correspondence to other government agencies.

- 10. We would also like to get a copy of the story told by Alvarado.
- 11. Have any attempts been made to locate the red-headed Negro man who was supposedly in the conference with Oswald observed by Alvardo?

Approved For Release 2011/09/22 : CIA-RDP10M00666R000503450003-2

(Diletin in time 5 and 6)

14/20/61

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APR 2 1 1964

Hr. Richard Dales
Deputy Idrector for Flows
Central Intelligence Agency
Yeshington, D. C. 20505

Cear Mr. Belms:

on behalf of the Commission I would like to three you and your representatives for the fine experation which was extended to representatives of the Commission buring the course of their work in Herino City from April 5 through April 13, 1964. I am informed that Mr. Scott, [the Chief of your station in Herino City,]was particularly generous with his time and paying and, in fact, contributed greatly to the success of our mission in Nexton.

During their stay in Mexico City the Conriccion reprocesstives discussed with Fr. Meatt and agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that portion of the Lee Burvey Couold investigation which concerned Cilberte Alvaredo Ugarto. We are seems, of course, from previous reports that the allegations made by Alvaredo were thoroughly investigated by Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation representatives in Mexico City in limited with the responsible Mexican law-enforcement authorities. Reference is made to the discussion of these allegations in your memorantum detect Jamesry 31, 1964 at pages 11 - 14.

ipon review of our complete file on this matter, we find that we lack full documentation of the investigation conducted of these allegations. It would be helpful if our records could be supplemented by a report from your Agency supplying more details

ec: Hr. Renkin

Mr. Willens

Mr. Coleman - Mr. Classon

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regarding the investigation undertaken by your Agency and other concerned Agencies into this matter and your evaluation so to the truth of Alversio's essentions. In particular, it would be belieful if a report could be submitted by the expert who conducted the polygraph exemination which emphasizes the specific conclusions which he made based on the responses by Alversio in conserring key questions on this matter.

Thank you for your continued exoperation.

Sinceraly.

J. Lee Bendin General Council

CLASSIFICATION CANCELED

By authority of: C. C. Lange 12/22/12

Name and title of person making the change:

MASSIFICATION CANCELED

Name and title of person making the change:

NNFL

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

April 22, 1964

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FROM:

W. David Slawson

SUBJECT: Trip to Mexico City

On Wednesday, April 8, 1964 Mr. Howard P. Willens, Mr. William T. Coleman, Jr., and Mr. W. David Slawson, all on the staff of the Commission, flew from Washington, D. C. to Mexico City. Mr. Coleman returned on Sunday, April 12 and Mr. Slawson and Mr. Willens returned on an airplane leaving Mexico City at about 3:20, Monday afternoon, April 13. This memorandum will briefly summarize this trip plus some of the meetings held in preparation for it.

TUESDAY - April 7 10:20 a.m. to 11:00 a.m.

Willens, Coleman and Slawson met with Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Thomas Mann,
Mr. Thomas Ehrlich of the Office of the Legal Adviser for the
State Department, and two aides to Mr. Mann in Mr. Mann's
office at about 10:20 a.m. Assistant Secretary Mann was
Ambassador to Mexico at the time of the assassination and
personally directed the investigatory effort and our relations
with the Mexican law enforcement authorities immediately after
the news of the President's death reached Mexico City. A copy

Ambassador Mann was then called out to another conference, for which he was already a half-hour late. As the meeting was breaking up he asked Mr. Slawson whether, with the benefit of hindsight, the members of the Commission staff felt that his recommendations and actions shortly after the assassination had been justified or whether we thought they were unduly rash. Mr. Slawson replied that although the investigation of the specific allegations of Alvarado had shown that they were in all probability a fabrication, he found nothing in what the Ambassador had done to have been unjustified, in view of the facts known to him and his assistants at the time and in view of the extreme seriousness of the occurrence.

3:30 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.

[At 3:30 in the afternoon Mr. Jack Witten of the CIA came to the Commission offices and conferred there with Slawson, Willens and Coleman. This conference grew out of a suggestion made by Mr. Richard Helms of the CIA about two weeks previous, in which he had mentioned that it would be a good idea if a representative of his agency met with those persons from the Commission who planned to go to Mexico Just before they left, in order to insure that the CIA could properly advise us of any last-minute arrangements and properly alert its people in Mexico of our arrival.

We discussed whether we would journey to Mexico officially and openly or completely incognito, and Mr. Witten offered to make arrangements to get us into Mexico completely unnoticed if we desired to do so. We told him that we did not want to try to keep the trip entirely secret. We would do our best to avoid any kind of newspaper publicity or public announcements. We intended to introduce ourselves at the Embassy and to Mexican officials as what we in fact were, representatives of the Commission.

Once we arrived in Mexico, in general terms, and asked for his comments on how best to achieve our goals. His reply in every instance was that we should deal on the spot with the CIA representative. Witten thought that our proposed journey was a very good idea. He repeated what Mr. Helms of the CIA had said a while ago, that there is no substitute for the "case officer" being "on the spot."

WEDNESDAY - April 8

8:15 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.

Our plane was scheduled to leave Washington from Dulles Airport at 9:30 in the morning and accordingly all three of us met at the Washington Air Terminal in the Albert Pick Motel at about 8:15 and later arrived at the Airport at about

Just inside the airport terminal we were met by Mr. Clarke Anderson and Mr. Rolfe Larson from the American Embassy. Anderson and Larson took the three of us to our hotel, the Continental Hilton.

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THURSDAY - April 9 9:00 a.m. to 9:30 a.m.

at the Embassy with Mr. Larson and discussed generally with him the progress of the assassination investigation while we were waiting to meet Ambassador Freeman. Clarke Anderson and Mr. "A", the CIA Chief in Mexico City, were conferring with the Ambassador and briefing him on the Mexican aspects of the assassination investigation. Ambassador Freeman had been at this post only two days, having just presented his credentials to the President of Mexico on Monday, April 6.

9:30 a.m. to 9:55 a.m.

We met with the Ambassador at about 9:30 in the morning. Present besides the three of us and the Ambassador were Minister Boonstra, Mr. "A", and Clarke Anderson.

Mr. Coleman explained in general terms the purpose of our trip. He said that we wanted to learn as much as possible about what investigations were currently being carried

3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.

[By pre-errangement we met at 3:30 with "A". With him again was his assistant. The occasion for this meeting was to discuss some confidential CIA procedure.]

/ We then discussed what the Commission could eventually publish to the American public out of all the material we had received in Mexico and in Machington from the CIA. All of us realized that any decisions arrived at this afternoon could be tentative only, since the final decision would have to be made at the higher echelons of both the CIA and the Commission. Slawson put out the suggestion that the Commission might publish a narrative containing all the detail obtainable from Silvia Duran's statements and from the "open" investigations carried on by FRI agents and Maxican police agents throughout Maxico, supplemented to some extent by the information obtained through the CIA's confidential sources. The sources for this narrative would be stated to be Silvia Duran's interrogation, the "open" investigations and "other confidential sources considered reliable by the Commission and the federal intelligence agencies involved." Mr. Scott's reply to this suggestion was that he thought it would be acceptable to the CIA. He said that although it involved a certain amount of compromise of his security arrangements, the compromise was acceptable when balanced against the importance of the occasion.

We then briefly discussed the statement of Silvia Duran which we had read earlier in the day in the FBI offices. The CIA had not yet seen this statement.

however, Betty Mora had been extremely sick and so this whole line of investigation was temporarily stymied. For several years Betty Mora has not been in good health, and in Anderson's opinion she is not a reliable person anyway, so he did not feel that her assertions would ever smount to much. He promised us a report on them, however, notwithstanding his feeling that they were not to be accorded a great deal of weight.

Finally, we posed the question to Anderson whether he knew of anything further, important or unimportant, which we as representatives of the President's Commission ought to be told. After some thinking and after asking larson whether he had anything along these lines and receiving a negative response, Anderson replied that he believed he had given us everything he knew.

We then briefly dropped into the CIA's office again for a brief discussion. We saked the CIA the same question we had saked Anderson about there being any further information we should be given. Their answer was to the same effect as Anderson's.

MONDAY APRIL 13

9:15 a.m. to 10:45 a.m.

At about 9:15 a.m. Mr. Slawson met with Mr. Rolfe Larson and one other FBI agent. Various maps of the Federal District of Mexico (which includes Mexico City) were examined and we agreed that one of the large, clear ones would best serve as the official exhibit for showing

instigation which might have existed and who appeared reasonably competent. Anderson pointed out that an attempt to throw in our own men at the time might have had adverse political effects and therefore have hindered the over-all effort. But, he admitted, subsequent results, such as the inadequate Hotel del Comercio investigation and the failure of the Mexican police to look beyond the fact that the name "Oswald" appeared on the Transportes Frontera passenger manifest, showed that the Mexican's investigation was not good enough. When that became apparent, said Anderson, the FBI's own men were assigned to the job.]

12 o'clock noon until 12:30 p.m.

Later in the morning, at some time about noon, Howard Willens and Mr. Slawson, accompanied by Mr. Clarke Anderson, visited Mr. Boonstra, Minister for Political Affairs at the American Embassy. Two points were discussed with Mr. Boonstra.

juncture with Mrs. Silvia Duran, the clerk at the Cuban Embassy who dealt most frequently with Oswald. The Mexican Government, through Mr. Luis Echevarria, Acting Secretary of the Interior, had declined our suggestion that we ask Mrs. Duran to appear at the American Embassy and when asked specifically about arranging an informal meeting with Duran, Echevarria reacted

(Deletin in paregraph 2)

mfd

TOP SECRET

June 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM

TO:

William T. Coleman, Jr.

FROM:

W. David Slawson WSJ

SUBJECT:

Appendix on Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico: Comments

on First Draft

Upon reading the first draft, I thought of the following comments and decided it would be best to put them into a memorandum so that I would not forget them. The comments are just listed in series, without regard to their relative importance.

- 1. I think that some place, probably early in the narrative, we should set out a list of all the documents, newspaper clippings, identification cards, etc., carried by Oswald on his Mexican trip. This would be desirable both from a straight informational viewpoint, because it sheds light on the purpose of this trip, and also because it will probably be important later, when we receive the report of the Cuban Government, for authentication purposes. For this purpose, reference is made to the Silvia Duran statement, the Pamela Mumford statement, FBI Exhibit No. 58, the testimony of the hotel clerk and to Marina's testimony.
- 2. The manner in which you have the telephone calls is absolutely certain to raise the strongest objections

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from the CIA. As a minimum, we must eliminate all exact quotes and all references to exact times. Furthermore, I think we must go further towards "fudging" the contents of these calls. For example, the reference to Oswald's wanting to go to "Odessa" probably should be eliminated, and any reference to telephone calls between the two embassies in which Oswald did not take part and which are not mentioned by Silvia Duran in her testimony to the Mexican police should be eliminated. Reference is made to our memorandum on our trip to Mexico where I proposed to Winston Scott that we would base this part of the narrative on the information obtainable from Silvia Duran's testimony, augmented slightly by the intercepts, eliminating all exact quotes and exact times, and write the narrative accordingly.

- 3. I think Oswald's preparations for hijacking an airplane to Cuba should be emphasized more. My thought would be to put this in in the full detailed extent possible, given the sources of information we have. This is because it strongly tends to confirm our other evidence that Oswald's sole purpose in going to Mexico was to reach Cuba. Reference here is made to Marina's testimony to the FBI after her appearance before the Commission.
- 4. On all references to Marina's testimony, I assume you used my notes made while reading this testimony. My notes

THE EXISTENCE OF A FORMIGN CONSPIRACY

I. <u>Introduction</u>

cutset of the most important question. Localing the Commission at the cutset of its mark was whether the assassination of President Kennedy was in any manner directed or encouraged by the government of a foreign nation. The violent death of the President of the United States under almost any circumstances would raise this question, and when it became evident that Lee Harvey Oswald was in all probability the man responsible, the question of foreign involvement was presented with special force. Oswald was committed to communist ideology, had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959, lived there for approximately two and one-half years and returned to the United States with a Russian wife in 1962. He strongly favored the government of Fidel Castro and openly propagandized on its behalf, and he had visited the Embassy of the Cuban Government in Mexico City only seven weeks before the assassination.

The Commission has concluded that neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba nor any other foreign nation was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. Not only has the investigation undertaken by the Commission and the federal agencies which worked with it failed to uncover any convincing evidence of involvement by a foreign power, but the evidence uncovered has been such that the Commission can state affirmatively that in all probability no foreign nation directed or encouraged Lee Harvey Oswald to kill the President.

It is difficult to prove a negative, -- that is, to prove that no order to kill was ever issued or that no subversive relationship existed. The difficulty is that in collecting information about a man, it is impossible to learn everything. There always exists the possibility that some new piece

TOP SECRET

September 25 and perhaps a day earlier, and that he crossed the Mexican border at Nuevo Laredo on September 26. His bus arrived in Mexico City at about 10:00 a.m. on September 27. The Commission has firm evidence that he then set out immediately on a series of visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in that city, spending almost his entire first 2 days at one or another of these two places or in making arrangements to visit them.

By sometime on Saturday, September 28, however, Oswald seems to have hit a blank wall at both Embassies. The Russians had told him firmly that although his application for a visa was being processed, he could not expect an answer for at least four months. The Cuban Embassy had even more firmly informed him that he could not obtain an "in-transit" visa to Cuba unless he could first show them a visa to visit Russia. Oswald made himself especially unwelcome at the Cuban Embassy by getting into a strong argument with the Consul, Eusebio Asque, by insisting so strongly that as a "friend of Cuba" he ought to be given a visa. So he was left with very little to do with either Embassy except to recontact the Russian one occasionally in the faint hope that they might have received an early answer on his request for a Soviet visa.] From Sunday through Wednesday morning, October 2, when he left Mexico City on a bus bound for the United States, apparently all he did was to make his travel arrangements, see the sights of the city and check a few more times with the Russian Embassy to find out if something had happened on his visa application.

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after the assassination, when he recognized Oswald's picture in a newspaper. The comment made on "A" by an American intelligence official who spoke with him on November 26 was, "He is young, quiet, very serious person, who speaks with conviction, knows enough English to understand conversation."

"A" was, of course, immediately subjected to intensive interrogation and investigation. [American intelligence checked back with the South American nation whose agent he claimed to be, and had the relationship confirmed. However, it was also learned that his superiors had no knowledge of "A" being in Mexico at that time, and they said that his presence there, as far as they were concerned, was unauthorized. They added that they knew nothing about any assignment of his to penetrate the Castro operations in Cuba. Apparently "A" was doing this on his own.]

Both the Mexican and American authorities continued to interrogate and cross-check "A"'s story. On November 30 our government was informed by the Mexican authorities that "A" had admitted in writing that his whole narrative about Oswald was false. He said that he had never seen Oswald, and that he had not seen anybody paid money in the Cuban Embassy. He also admitted that he never tried to telephone the American Embassy about the matter and that his first contact was in person on November 26, when as we now know, he spoke to an American official. He still maintained that he had visited the Cuban Embassy, however. The Mexican authorities stated that they were inclined to believe this last part of the story. "A" said that his motive in telling the

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know it but the 17th would make it even more unlikely than the 18th.

On September 17 Oswald appeared at the Louisiana State Unemployment

Commission in New Orleans and also cashed a check from the Texas

Employment Commission at the Winn-Dixie Store No. 1425 in New Orleans.)

On the basis of the polygraph results and the retractions made by

"A" when he saw the results, and on the basis of discrepancies which

appeared in his story, it was concluded that he was lying and that the

reasons he gave to the Mexican police for lying were probably sincere. 18/

On the basis of the investigations outlined in this section of the Report, the Commission has concluded that the Cuban government was in no way associated with the assassination and that Oswald had no subversive relationship of any kind with the Cuban government.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF VIRGINIA) SO

Richard Helms, being duly sworn says:

- I am the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency.
- 2. I base this affidavit on my personal knowledge of the affairs of the central intelligence agency and on detailed inquiries of those officers and employees within my supervision who would have knowledge about any photographs furnished by that Agency to the Vederal Bureau of Investigation.
- 3. I have personally examined the photograph which has been marked Commission Exhibit No. 237, a copy of which is attached to the affidavit of Inspector James R. Malley, dated July 14, 1964, and the photograph attached to the affidavit of Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum dated July 10, 1964.

- 4. Those photographs are partial copies of a photograph furnished by the Central Intelligence Agency to the Federal Bureau of Investigation on November 22, 1963. They are referred to as partial only because, on information and belief, Odum and Malley personally trimmed or cropped their copies of the photograph to exclude the background against which the individual portrayed in these photographs is depicted as the original photograph.
 - 5. The figure portrayed in those photographs is the same individual portrayed in the original photograph.
- 6. The original photograph was taken by the Central

 Intelligence Agency outside of the Continental United

 States sometime during the period July 1, 1963 to November 23, 1963.

| Subscribed and sworn to this day of | inia, by the duly |
|-------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| Notary Public | nord the last |

Richard Helms

My commission expires

(Seal)

/The photograph referred to in the above affidavit of Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms as being attached to the affidavit of Special Agent Bardwell D. Odum is included in the Exhibits volumes as

Odum Exhibit No. 1.7